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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of market structure on bank fragility. We 
take the case of the Tunisian banking system during the period 1990-2012 and we use 
panel data for 10 Tunisian banks. The main conclusions show that the Tunisian banking 
sector fragility and risk taking by banks are explained by market structure. This structure is 
determined in another work where we found that banks in Tunisia operate in monopolistic 
competition. Indeed, the Tunisian banking system suffers from fragility that refl ects main-
ly the large share of nonperforming loans and whose principal cause the banking market 
structure.
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Introduction
The effect of market structure on bank fragility has been a debate in the banking 
literature. In fact, this relationship is discussed from two points of view (Franklin, 
F. and Gale D. (2004)). The fi rst, “competition-fragility”, shows that competition de-
stroys the market power of banks, reducing their profi t margins and subsequently 
their franchise value. This drives banks to take more risk to compensate their loss 
and increase their income which leads to their fragility. Several empirical studies 
have confi rmed this relationship including the study of Keeley (1990) who showed 
that increased competition and deregulation that characterized the banking system of 
the United States in 1980, eroded monopoly rents and resulted in fragility of banking 
system. The second view is “competition-stability”. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) ar-
gue that the market power of credit can lead to a high level of risk as the application 
of a high interest rate on loans, which makes repayment more diffi cult and increases 
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the moral hazard and encourages borrowers to choose riskier projects. In addition, a 
strong banking market concentration may lead banks to take more risk if they consid-
er themselves as large banks so that they are far from going bankrupt and if they feel 
protected by the government (Berger A. N., Klapper L. F. and Turk-Ariss R. (2008)).
In general, many economists suggest that the relationship between market struc-
ture and bank fragility is positive and strong, especially in the presence of informa-
tion asymmetry. Indicators of bank fragility are multiple and are presented by var-
ious risks that banks may have. The bank run which induces liquidity risk occupies 
the largest share in the fragility of banks. Indeed, the rush will occur if the total value 
of early withdrawals of bank customers exceeds the amount available for short-term 
investments. In this case, the bank will be forced to sell illiquid assets. This situation 
may jeopardize the solvency and liquidity of the bank. Credit risk, market risk and 
operational risk are the other indicators of bank fragility.
Moreover, the fragility of banks can be the cause of social costs as well as private. 
Indeed, the bank is considered the most important link in the fi nancial system espe-
cially in developing countries, since it represents the type of fi nancing the most re-
quested. Thus, the failure of a bank may have harmful consequences on the fi nancing 
of investment projects and therefore on economic activity. In addition, the bankrupt-
cy of a bank can cause the system failure through contagion or domino effect. It is 
therefore necessary to ensure “good health” and the soundness of the banking sector.
The causes of banks frailty are many which include the market structure, uncon-
trolled fi nancial liberalization, behavior of banks and the speculative disaster myo-
pia. In this work, we will focus only on the impact of market structure on excessive 
risk-taking by banks. The analysis of this impact will be in the empirical section 
where we will try to identify the relationship of market structure and bank risk taking 
and consequently the fragility and the stability of banking system.
Thus, the method of measuring risk must be chosen so that it refl ects the risk that 
we attempt to analyze. Some empirical studies use the Z-index which represents a 
reverse proxy of the overall risk of banks, while others are based on non-performing 
loans to analyze credit risks, and others use the Lerner index.
In this paper, we propose to present, in the fi rst section, the review of the literature 
on market structure and fragility of the banks where we will analyze the indicators 
and consequences as well as the main causes of this fragility in particular the market 
structure. In a second section, we propose to model empirically the impact of market 
structure on bank risk taking and the stability of banking system using an economet-
ric model. We will take the case of the Tunisian banking sector where we will use the 
HHI index of concentration, the concentration ratio of n-banks, the Lerner index and 
the Z-index to identify the structure of the banking market. So we try to answer to 
the question: is it the causal relationship between market structure and bank fragility 
is verifi ed for the Tunisian banking market?
3Market Structure and Bank Fragility: Application to the Tunisian Banking System
Literature Review 
The Indicators and Consequences of Bank Fragility 
The Bank Run and Liquidity Risk
The information asymmetry between banks, depositors and borrowers, and the trans-
formation of maturity refl ecting the investment by the bank short-term deposits in 
long-term assets may expose bank to the problem of rush. Banks offer due depositors 
contracts that allow them to withdraw a fi xed amount on demand. If the total value 
of early withdrawals exceeds the amount available for short-term investments, a run 
can take place and the bank will be forced to sell illiquid assets. This situation may 
jeopardize the creditworthiness and liquidity of the bank.
An institution is characterized by liquidity risk if it can be jeopardized by a sudden 
loss of confi dence of its lenders and unexpected. The liquidity risk of an institution 
depends on both the maturity of its debt and the nature of its assets. To illustrate this 
mechanism rush and its effect on bank liquidity, Diamond D. and P. Dybvic (1983) 
have established a model that highlights the important role of banks focusing on the 
specifi c characteristic of deposits. Indeed, the specifi city of bank deposit is that they 
are fully liquid assets in the sense that they may be withdrawn at any time. They 
represent no risk of capital loss and they are perfectly divisible by all and accepted 
as payment method. In their model, these authors represent the bank as providing 
insurance to depositors of liquidity; on the contrary, bank credit commitments are 
irreversible and therefore they are illiquid.
Furthermore, the existence of bank illiquid assets (loans) generates vulnerability 
in the bank. This vulnerability is due to the phenomenon of the rush of depositors 
which occurs when all depositors or a majority of them seek to convert their de-
posits into currency or transfer their deposits to another bank (Laurence Scialom 
(1999). The rush causes panic and induces banking crisis. Indeed, if there is a mas-
sive withdrawal of deposits (rush), banks must write off their long-term assets, which 
aggravates the problem of liquidity of the banking system, even if banks are solvent. 
The situation becomes more critical when banks fi nance projects unproductive and 
unprofi table, which affects their profi tability. Thus, prices of securities are falling, 
and banks become insolvent.
Other Risks 
Credit Risk (Default Risk)
It is related to losses resulting from the failure of a counterparty bank. Indeed, when 
bank lends money to agents who have severe diffi culties, they will suffer losses and 
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will expose to bankruptcy. In other words, credit risk arises when the debtor can no 
longer honor its commitments, that is to say pay principal and interest. Thus, credit 
risk is the risk of insolvency of the debtor. It represents a major source of problems 
during deceleration of infl ation because the real cost of credit is then increased.
The bank must protect themselves from the risk of non repayment of certain bor-
rowers, and this by examining their solvency. Indeed, the bank must examine the fi les 
of loan applicants and determine those who are creditworthy and those who are not. 
Confi dence and subsequent repayment are not suffi cient because there is never any 
absolute certainty. Credit risk can be measured by the share of nonperforming loans 
in total loans.
Market Risk
Market risk appears when a participant is in position to suffer unfavorable market 
data or market volatility. It represents the danger of loss of banking positions, due to 
external factors of the bank such as fl uctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, asset 
prices or changes in economic policy. 
The interest rate risk: is the risk of loss due to an adverse change in interest rates. 
A change in interest rates can be very costly, if we are not careful. It involves two 
types of operations: the intermediation operations that pose a rate risk when the rates 
references are different for loan and debt, and market operations that are related to in-
terest rate risk often voluntarily taken on the basis of anticipation made by the bank.
The risk of exchange rate: the banker must also reckon with the risk of changes in 
value following a change in exchange rates. Exchange risk is related to transactions 
in currency. It is particularly high during periods of volatility of various currencies. 
Banks are exposed to such risk when the deposits and debts are denominated in two 
currencies.
The risk of course: it is related to the portfolio of property or shares. This results 
from an adverse change in a stock index which indicates a risk of loss to the bank.
It should be noted that the market risk can turn into a liquidity risk. This type of 
risk is specifi c to the transformation function. It is linked to two conditions: the fi rst 
is that the assets of the bank must be less liquid than its liabilities; the second is that 
the liquidation of assets must result in losses to the bank.
Operational Risk
According to BIS (2001a), operational risk is associated with the risk of direct or 
indirect loss from inadequate or failed due to procedures, people, internal systems 
or from external events such as for example a poorly written contract. Indeed, opera-
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tional risk comes from ineffi cient management of resources in the bank. It is mainly 
related to problems of dysfunction and of internal controls.
The Consequences of the Failure of Banks 
From an economic standpoint, a bank goes bankrupt when the market value of its 
assets falls below the market value of its liabilities, so that the market value of its 
capital, that is to say the net worth, becomes negative (Kaufman G. (1995)).
The failure of banks is considered more serious than the failure of companies to 
the extent that banks are more fragile and more susceptible to failure than others. Ac-
cording to Kaufman (1996), there are three reasons why banks are considered most 
vulnerable. The fi rst is related to the low ratio of capital to total assets that does not 
take into account the likelihood of losses. The second is the low ratio of total fund to 
assets that may require the sale of productive assets to meet deposit obligations. The 
third reason is the high demand for short-term loans and the importance of the ratio 
of short-term loans to total credit.
The Private and Social Costs of Bankruptcy 
In general, the failure of banks may have private and social costs: 
The private costs of bank failure: these costs are borne by the owners of the 
bank, depositors, bondholders issued by banks and other creditors. According to 
Bordes (1991) the failure of banks generates two types of effects. Direct effects 
concern particularly the costs of bankruptcy proceedings, and indirect effects that 
are related to operational diffi culties of the bank. These effects include: the diffi -
culties encountered by the bank in the recruitment and retention of staff, the time 
spent in the judicial process rather than the management of the bank and especially 
the diffi culties of fi nding funding. In addition, depositors must fi rst, recover the 
amount of their deposits, and secondly establish new customer relationships with 
other banks.
The social costs of bankruptcy: When bank fails, the clients, not to bear the con-
sequences, exchange deposits against tickets. Thus, to protect themselves against this 
risk, banks will try to hold excess reserves more important. This behavior results in 
the reduction of money supply and thus the money supply which means, according to 
Bernanke (1983), a recession in economic activity and rising unemployment. 
In addition, monetary policy can also be weakened by the bank failure. Indeed, the 
central bank fails to achieve its objectives and achieve its strategies including the 
reduction of infl ation because the counterparties in the money will be spent on fund-
ing the losses of banks. However, even if the costs of bank failures are defl ationary 
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or neutral in medium term, overreaction of the authorities to limit these costs may 
actually be causing a risk of infl ation.
Risk of Contagion in the Banking Market 
Theoretically, the contagion in the banking sector is considered more serious than in 
other sectors. In this regard Kaufman (1994) identifi ed fi ve reasons:
• Contagion occurs more rapidly
• It is distributed more widely within the banking industry
• It leads to many failures 
• It causes signifi cant losses to creditors (depositors)
• It spreads beyond the banking sector to move to other sectors and other countries.
In general, the contagion in the interbank markets may occur in three situations: a 
situation where global liquidity is insuffi cient, the second when market expectations 
create “externalities” and the third situation where a bankruptcy of a bank leads to a 
domino effect (Degryse H. and Nguyen G. (2004)). 
A lack of global liquidity: according to Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) the lack 
of liquidity in the market could occur in cases where banks have excessive confi -
dence in the ability of interbank markets to absorb temporary liquidity shocks. This 
confi dence pushes banks to reduce their investment in liquid assets. Thus, the link 
between banks may create problems if the aggregate liquidity is insuffi cient. In this 
case, banks try to avoid liquidation of their assets in the long term, and thus to liqui-
date their claims on other banks which may be in other regions. Therefore, a crisis in 
one region can spread by contagion to other regions and introduce liquidity problems 
(Allen, F. and D. Gale (2000)).
The “Externalities” represent a second potential channel of contagion. These 
externalities are related to the banking panic occurs when depositors run to the 
bank to withdraw their funds. Depositors of other banks for fear of not recover-
ing their deposits, also decide to withdraw their funds. This results in a massive 
withdrawal of funds from banks which indicates a lack of liquidity. These exter-
nalities may also affect banks of different natures. For example, the bankruptcy of 
investment bank could cause a liquidity and trust problem for commercial bank for 
example.
Domino effect: the bankruptcy of a bank may cause a domino effect where each 
bank insolvent will endanger all other institutions that are related to it. Indeed, an in-
solvent bank cannot meet its obligations to its creditors and other banks, threatening 
the market’s confi dence and increases the resource cost of other banks. Contagion 
occurs when “mechanically” by direct links between banks that is to say by inter-
bank credits.
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The Causes of Bank Fragility 
Competition and Fragility in the Banking System
The relationship between competition and fi nancial fragility has been widely ignored 
by the banking theory. It has been recognized that this relationship is complex and 
multifaceted. In fact, there is no agreement on its nature or its consequences for 
economic policy. There are different views in the literature trying to explain this re-
lationship. The fi rst point of view, “competition-fragility”, assumes that competition 
enhances fragility. This view is supported by analysis that takes into account the 
risks associated with competition for deposits, banking deregulation and risky be-
havior of banks. It follows from this that the concentration or regulation can enhance 
the stability of the banking sector. This partly explains why the assumption of bank 
competition has long been disputed and justifi es the need for banking regulation. 
However, empirically this implication is questionable. On the one hand, some studies 
show that banking concentration is negatively correlated with competition; secondly, 
the question of how competition affects the stability of banking systems and the ef-
fectiveness of regulation is not well understood.
Another point of view, “competition-stability”, argues that bank competition en-
hances fi nancial stability. Theoretically, some analysts argue that competition can 
enhance stability by reducing information asymmetries or by increasing liquidity in 
the inter-bank markets. Empirically this hypothesis is verifi ed by studies on the his-
tory of U.S. banks and by studies that rely on international data such as for example 
those of Rolnick and Weber (1983) and Claessens and Klingebiel (2001).
Among the authors who have analyzed the direct relationship between competi-
tion and fragility include Smith (1984) which was based on the model of Diamond 
and Dybvic (1983). Indeed, banks compete to attract depositors who have different 
probabilities and different dates of withdrawal. Because the problem of adverse se-
lection, only depositors know their own probability of withdrawal. In this case, the 
Nash equilibrium cannot be established and the contract balance is destroyed by the 
possibility for banks to offer contracts to a particular segment of depositors. Thus, 
the banking system is no longer viable. Pauzner (2005) and Rochet and Vives (2005) 
stressed that the relationship between competition and banking fragility may be pos-
itive. Indeed, the increased rate on deposits causes a failure of coordination between 
banks and consequently causes a bank run.
Other recent empirical studies show that the relationship between bank compe-
tition, concentration, and the fragility of the banking system is ambiguous. For ex-
ample, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006) fi nd that the risk of fi nancial crises 
is weaker in more concentrated banking systems, but higher in the less competitive 
systems and in countries where legal systems are less developed. 
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Market Structure and Risk-Taking
There are no clear results regarding the effect of competition on risk taking by 
banks. What is generally acknowledged is that intense competition in the credit 
market may encourage banks to accept bad risks. In fact, banks can offer terms of 
the debt that does not match the risk profi le of the borrower or alternatively to their 
credit policy, particularly a non risk-adjusted pricing, which generates a margin 
that does not pay the cost of risk. Indeed, shareholders and bank managers are en-
couraged to take more risks because lower profi ts, due to increased competition, re-
duce the economic value of the bank. However, several authors examined the rela-
tionship between competition and risk-taking that some of them have checked this 
link and admitted that competitive factors are the cause of excessive risk-taking, 
while others do not. Hellmann et al. (2000) for example, demonstrate the ability to 
conduct excessive risk-taking in a highly competitive market and how regulation 
can help to mitigate this link.
The impact of increased competition on the probability of bank failure is studied 
by Caminal and Matutes (2002). Their goal was to fi nd a relationship between mar-
ket structure and bank failures. According to these authors, banks have two ways to 
infl uence the selection of projects submitted by borrowers: the rationing of credit that 
can increase the marginal return of capital and may reduce incentives for excessive 
risk taking, and control of the borrower. The result found was an ambiguity in the 
relationship between market structure and bank failures. Monitoring has a positive 
effect on investment while increasing the rate of credit generates lower investment. 
On the other hand, a positive relationship between the level of investment and risk; 
improve investment increases the credit risk in the presence of decreasing returns to 
scale and non-diversifi able risk.
The study of a direct relationship between competition and the level of risk is 
presented by Boyd and Nicolo (2005). They argue that low competition in the credit 
market leads to an increase in the excess risk and consequently the probability of 
bank failure. Indeed, the weakness of competition resulted in a high concentration 
of banks allows the latter to increase their pension. However, excess of rent implies 
a high interest rate and therefore a risk of default of the bank. These authors show 
that when entrepreneurs choose risky investment projects, banks are becoming more 
risky as competition decreases. Indeed, a high level of competition in the credit mar-
ket reduced the lending rates that entrepreneurs pay, this increases their return and 
reduces their incentives to take risks.
The excessive risk-taking related to the degree of competition may also be ex-
plained by the pricing of risk. In this regard, Cordella and Yeyati (2002) have sought 
to verify the relationship between competition and pricing risk. The rates on deposits 
adjust to the default probability of the bank when there is asymmetric information on 
the degree of portfolio risk. However, when information on risk is available or when 
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the deposit insurance premium is adjusted for risk, then the effect of competition on 
the excess risk can be reduced. 
Keely (1990) concluded that franchise value has a negative effect on risk taking. 
The general idea is that a high level of competition reduces the franchise value of the 
bank which pushes bank to take risks. Keely has seen bank failures in the United States 
during the year 1980 whose causes were deregulation and market factors that reduce 
the rents of monopoly banks. In the same context, Edwards and Mishkin (1995) show 
that the excessive risk-taking observed in the United States in 1980 was the response of 
banks to the sharp decline in profi ts due to competition in the fi nancial market.
Besanko and Thakor (1993) use this implication in the context of banking rela-
tionship, where banks have private information about their customers. This allows 
the bank to be informational monopoly and acquire information rents. The bank 
does not take risk as long as it captures at least some of these rents. However, as soon 
as the banking sector becomes more competitive, the value of banking relationship 
decreases and banks’ exposure to risk increases.
Marcus (1984) used a model of a single period to show that the decline of fran-
chise value grow the bank to engage in riskier policies. Dermine (1986) extended the 
Klein-Monti model by incorporating the risk of bankruptcy and insurance deposits, 
and shows a negative relationship between the level of credit risk of the bank and its 
power on the deposit market. Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1986) showed that in-
creased competition will destroy the surplus that banks can earn by identifying quality 
borrowers. In fact, reducing the franchise value leads banks to reduce their screening of 
potential borrowers and, therefore, the quality of loan portfolio decreases.
Even if the prospect of a negative relationship between competition and stability 
remains the predominant, more recently, a number of studies have suggested that the 
relationship between competition and risk taking must not be robust. In particular, a 
higher degree of competition may encourage banks to be more cautious when specif-
ic aspects of the relationship between banks and companies, important functions of 
banks and characteristics (eg monitoring) are taken into account. 
Using a dynamic optimization model with an infi nite horizon, Suarez (1994) 
showed a compromise between market power and solvency. If the market power of 
banks decreases, then the incentive to engage in riskier policies increases signifi cant-
ly. As the franchise value of the bank is a component of bankruptcy costs, this should 
encourage the Bank to pursue a cautious policy that increases the solvency of the 
bank (G. Jimenez, Jose A. Lopez, and Saurina J. (2007)).
Market Structure and Fragility of Banks: Empirical Modeling
We will test the effect of market structure on bank fragility using data from the 
10 Tunisian banks during the period 1990-2012. Referring to the work of Marti-
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nez-Miera and Repullo (2008) and Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2008), we use a 
nonlinear relationship between fi nancial stability and market structure in banking. 
The general model used for estimation is of the form: 
Financial stability
i




2, control of the bank, 
banking environment) 
Where i represents banks. We will use various indicators of risk exposure as a 
proxy for fi nancial stability (dependent variable): the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans (NPL) to measure credit portfolio risk, the Z-index as an inverse measure 
of overall risk of banks and the ratio of equity to total assets (ETA) to measure the 
level of capitalization of banks.
The Z-index is a reverse proxy for the probability of bank failures. It combines 
profi tability, debt and the volatility of profi tability in a single formula. It is presented 
by the ratio:
Where: 
- ROA is the average of profi tability of banks’ assets during the test period.
- E / TA is the ratio of equity to total assets and s
 ROAi
 is the standard deviation of 
return on assets throughout the study period.
The Z-index increases with increase of profi tability and capitalization, and de-
creases with unstable incomes resulted in an increase in the standard deviation of 
return on assets. It represents the inverse of the probability of bank failure and an 
indicator of the fi nancial stability of the bank. 
In the banking literature, several measures of degree of competition were used. 
In this work, we use the Lerner index as a proxy of market power to analyze the 
relationship between market structure and fi nancial stability. The Lerner index has 
been widely used in the banking sector as an indicator of market power. It is a more 
accurate measure of market power that measures the concentration standard. In ac-
cordance with the new approach of industrial organization, this index is calculated to 
obtain a measure of bank competition. The use of the Lerner index as an indicator of 
degree of market power is explained by two reasons. The fi rst is that the Lerner index 
can be estimated for each bank of the sample; therefore, we can analyze the determi-
nants of market power by using the information at the banking level (bank-specifi c 
variables). The second reason is that we can analyze the evolution of market power 
by estimating the Lerner index each year.
The Lerner index is the average mark-up of price over marginal costs. In other 
words, it is defi ned as the difference between the price (P) and marginal cost (MC), 
divided by the price, either (P - MC) / P. Different values of this index allow to deter-
 
Zi =
ROAi + E / TAi
σ ROAi
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mine the nature of the market structure. Indeed, in a situation of perfect competition, 
price equals marginal cost and the index is equal to zero. When prices are above 
marginal cost, the Lerner index is positive and varies between zero and unity. When 
the value of the index approaches the unity, so the power of market increases. 




 is the average price of banking production presented by the ratio of total in-
come over total assets of bank i in year t, as presented by Fernandez de Guevara, 
Maudos and Perez (2005) and Carbo et al. (2009). 
- MC
TAit
 is the marginal cost of total assets of bank i at time t. 
The marginal cost is estimated on the basis of a translog cost function with an 
output (represented by total assets) and three input prices (price of labor, price of 
physical capital, and price of borrowed funds). 
The cost function is specifi ed as follows:
Where:
CT: means the total cost
Qit: total assets of bank i at time t 
W1: the price of labor (ratio of personnel expenses to total assets) 
W2: the price of physical capital (the ratio of non-interest expenses of other fi xed 
assets)
W3: The price of borrowed funds (ratio of interest paid to total funding).
The total cost is the sum of staff costs, expenses other than interest and interest 
paid. The estimated coeffi cients of the cost function are then used to calculate the 
marginal cost (MC) using the following equation:
We will also use the Herfi ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as an indicator of market 














































depends on the measuring of the market share held by large banks (Honohan & 
Kinsella (1982), Rhoades (1993)). It measures the degree of concentration of deposits 
and loans market, where the total deposits and total loans are taken as indicators for 
measuring the size of banks. Concentration is high when the index is high. 
The U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) divides the values of the HHI into three 
categories. For an HHI less than 0.1 (or 1000) the market is considered unconcen-
trated. For a value between 0.1 and 0.18 (or 1000 and 1800) market concentration is 
moderate. Finally, if the value of HHI is more than 0.18 (or 1800) then the market is 
highly concentrated. Generally, a decrease in the HHI means a loss of market power 
of banks and increased competition, while an increase indicates otherwise. HHI has 
the advantage of including information from the distribution of market shares and the 
number of fi rms (banks) involved in the industry.
Variables and Data Sources
We collect data on Tunisian banks for 2001 to 2006 from the Bank-Scope database 
and from APTBEF1 and activity reports banks for the remaining years (1990 to 2000 
and 2007 -2012). The model includes 10 Tunisian banks:
                                  Table 1: List of banks
Public Banks 
BNA National Agricultural Bank
STB Tunisian Bank Corporation
BS Bank of the South
UIB International Union of Banks
BH Housing bank
Private Banks
BIAT Arab International Bank of Tunisia
BT Bank of Tunisia
AB Amen Bank
Foreign banks
ATB Arab Tunisian Bank.
UBCI Banking  union for trade and industry
The dependent variable is represented by the ratio of nonperforming loans to total 
assets, by the Z-index and by the ratio of equity to total assets. The exogenous vari-
able indicates the structure of the banking market measured by the Lerner index. We 
also use traditional methods for measuring concentration like HHI deposit and HHI 
credit to ensure verifi cation.
We use other variables to control the size and composition of bank assets. The 
size control is provided by the logarithm of total assets, while the composition of 
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assets is measured by the share of loans in total assets and the ratio of fi xed assets to 
total assets. We also include control variables at the macro level. The fi rst is used as a 
proxy for the environment of banks, which is the “legal rights” index2 (Djankov, Mc-
Liesh, and Shleifer (2005)). This index measures how collateral and bankruptcy-re-
lated laws help to facilitate the granting of credits. The second is the log of GDP per 
capita, which allows monitoring of changes in economic development in Tunisia34.
Empirical Results and Interpretations 
Tables 2, 3, 4 of appendix show the results of our estimates. We used the methods of 
ordinary least squares and generalized least squares. Financial stability is presented 
by three variables. In Table 2 we measure credit portfolio risk by the ratio of non-per-
forming loans (NPL. The overall risk of the bank is measured by Z-index and pre-
sented in Table 3, while the risk of leverage is measured by the ratio of capitalization 
of banks and presented in Table 4.
Competition (or market power) is measured by the HHI deposits and HHI loans 
and by the Lerner index. As already mentioned, a high value of these indices implies 
a signifi cant market power and hence a less competitive market. We also includes 
the size of the bank, the asset mix, the “Legal Rights” index and GDP per capita 
expressed in logarithms in all regressions to control developments in the business 
environment and economic development.
We include a quadratic term in the estimated equations to allow a nonlinear rela-
tionship between the measure of risk and market structure in banking.
Table 2 of appendix presents the estimation results where the ratio of non-per-
forming loans (NPL) to total assets is the dependent variable and is used as a proxy 
for portfolio risk. In the fi rst column where market power is measured by the Lerner 
index, the coeffi cient of linear term and squared term are positive and statistically 
signifi cant. Then there exists a signifi cant and positive relationship between market 
structure and credit portfolio risk.
In the second and third column the signs of the coeffi cients of HHI of linear term 
are different from those of squared terms. So it was necessary to calculate the infl ec-
tion points to clarify the nature of the relationship between market power and risk. For 
HHI deposits, the coeffi cient of linear term is negative and statistically signifi cant, 
whereas the sign of the coeffi cient of squared term is positive and statistically signif-
icant. The calculation of the infl ection point of the function to the square allowed us 
to determine the type of relationship. Indeed, we found an infl ection point equal to 
0.12 implying that 88% of the values of the HHI deposits are located below this point 
which allows us to conclude that a positive relationship is established between market 
structure and credit risk. The result for the HHI credit shows that the level of banks 
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power in the credit market has an effect on the amount of non-performing loans given 
that 82% of values are below the infl ection point which is equal to 0,14.
Table 3 of appendix presents the results concerning the relationship between mar-
ket structure and the Z-index used as proxy to the overall risk of the bank. The in-
fl ection point calculated for the Lerner index leads us to conclude that all values are 
above this point. It follows that there is no relationship, neither positive nor negative, 
between the market structure determined by the Lerner index and the level of risk. 
However, the relationship is positive and signifi cant between market structure mea-
sured by the HHI deposits and the overall risk of the bank. The infl ection point calcu-
lated from the square function allows us to conclude that almost 89% of the values of 
the HHI deposits are located below this point. The result for the HHI credits indicates 
that the relationship is signifi cant between market structure and risk. 
The results of the third model where the ratio of equity to total assets is the dependent 
variable fi gure in Table 4 of appendix. The fi rst column shows the coeffi cients of the Le-
rner index which are positive and statistically signifi cant. The infl ection point is equal to 
-0.05 and lies below the values of the Lerner index. Therefore, a positive and signifi cant 
relationship may exist between market structure and capitalization of banks.  
The second column shows the coeffi cients of the HHI deposits where we ob-
serve a negative sign for the linear term and a positive sign for the squared term. In 
this case, it is not possible to determine what type of relationship is there between 
the market power and capitalization of banks. However, the calculation of infl ection 
point allow we to conclude that the market structure presented by HHI deposits in-
fl uence positively and signifi cantly the capitalization and thereafter banking stability 
(94% of HHI values are below the infl ection point that is equal to 0.13).
For the third index (HHI loans), its coeffi cients are not statistically signifi cant, 
therefore no relationship, either positive or negative, can exist between market struc-
ture measured by HHI loans and capitalization of banks.
Regarding the control variables, our model includes three variables which are the 
logarithm of total assets to control the size of banks, the share of loans in total assets 
and the share of fi xed assets to total assets for measuring the composition of the asset. 
The different results are presented in the tables above. First, we note that in most cases 
the variable measuring the size (BASI) has a negative sign and is statistically signifi -
cant. Therefore, we can conclude that the large banks have fewer non-performing loans 
(NPL) than small banks. As a result, the portfolios of these banks are generally of good 
quality and are characterized by greater stability in spite of their low capitalization. 
This result confi rms the argument “too big to fail” that a major bank has a low prob-
ability of bankruptcy. This is also verifi ed by Claeys and Schoors (2007). Secondly, it 
was found that banks with a high ratio of loans to total assets are less capitalized and 
therefore more fragile. This implies that fi nancial intermediation of banks is so strong 
that banks are more likely to take more risk. This relationship is found by Wheelock 
and Wilson (2000) for the United States, and Arena (2008) for Asia and the countries 
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of Latin America. Thirdly, the results indicate that the composition of the asset has a 
positive and signifi cant effect on the behavior of banks in most cases.
Moreover, we note that the “legal rights” index is positively and signifi cantly related 
to the fragility of banks presented by non-performing loans, and to bank capitalization. 
This result appears normal in the case of credits insofar as the increase in this index 
implies that the bankruptcy laws and safeguards are used to facilitate the granting of 
credits. But the increased volume of loans and guarantees may explain the high pro-
portion of non-performing loans. For capitalization, an inverse relationship between 
the index and the level of capitalization could exist only in the case of countries where 
the business environment is robust with strong investor protection. In this case, banks 
are not required to hold capital levels very high (Allen N. Berger, Leora F. Klapper and 
Rima Turk-Ariss (2008). However, the positive relationship between the “legal rights” 
index and the ratio of equity in a country like Tunisia is expected that the business en-
vironment is too strong and investors are not heavily protected.
Regarding economic development measured by GDP per capita is negatively asso-
ciated with bank fragility and positively associated with market capitalization.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to analyze, in one hand, the theoretical foundations 
and explanations of the banking system fragility and secondly, the relationship be-
tween banking market structure and the fragility of banks in Tunisia. According to 
the theory, the fragility of banks is explained by several factors related to bank be-
haviour. Indeed, the market structure associated with information asymmetry in the 
banking sector is an important element in determining the behaviour of bank.Thus, a 
bank has market power behaves differently from that suffered competition from other 
banks. This difference in behaviour implies a difference in risk taking by the bank 
and therefore the level of fragility.
It should be noted that taking excessive risk exposes the bank at risk of bankrupt-
cy and thereafter collapse of the banking system. The spread of bankruptcy due to 
the contagion effect that occurs when aggregate liquidity is insuffi cient, when market 
expectations create “externalities” and when the bankruptcy of a bank leads to a 
domino effect. The contagion is considered more serious in the banking system than 
in others since the banks are linked to each other because of interbank lending. Thus, 
risk-taking becomes more serious when it is started at a bank and later switching to 
the whole banking sector and even the fi nancial sector; in other words, when the bank 
risk becomes a systemic risk.
The empirical part of this paper was to test the impact of market structure on the 
fragility of Tunisian banks during the period 1990-2012. The main conclusions show 
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that the Tunisian banking sector fragility and risk taking by banks are explained by 
market structure. This structure is determined in another work where we found that 
banks in Tunisia operate in monopolistic competition. Indeed, the Tunisian banking 
system suffers from fragility that refl ects mainly the large share of nonperforming 
loans and whose principal cause the banking market structure.
The fragility of the banking system legitimizes government intervention via the 
defi nition of rules and regulatory measures. Indeed, given the risks posed to fi nancial 
institutions throughout the economy and social costs of bank failure, supervision and 
regulation of credit institutions are determining factors in the stability of the banking 
system. The main objectives are then, the protection of customer and of the banking 
system of market failures.This may be the subject of a future work.
Appendix






The ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans; a higher value indicates a riskier loan portfolio. 
Source: APTBEF and BankScope, 2006.
A proxy to the overall risk of the bank; a larger value indicates a higher bank stability and less
overall bank risk
Source: APTBEF and BankScope, 2006
The ratio of capitalization: the ratio of equity to total assets;









« Legal rights » index
Indicator of  bank competition, calculated as the average mark-up of price over marginal costs; 
higher values indicating less competition in the banking market
Source: APTBEF and BankScope, 2006
Indicator of bank concentration, measured by the Herfi ndahl-Hirschman Deposits Index; 
Higher values indicating greater market concentration.
Source: APTBEF and BankScope, 2006
Indicator of bank concentration, measured by the Herfi ndahl-Hirschman Loans Index; 
Higher values indicating greater market concentration.
Source: APTBEF and BankScope, 2006
The ratio of loans to total assets (CRTA) and the ratio of fi xed assets to total assets (FATA). 
There are used as bank controls variables.
Source: APTBEF and BankScope, 2006
The log of total assets; used to control the size of bank
Source: APTBEF and BankScope, 2006
The log of GDP per capita, used to control changes in economic development.
Source:BCT (Central Bank of Tunisia)
An index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending. The 
index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are 
better designed to expand access to credit.
Source: «Doing Business 2010, Tunisia»: The World Bank/the International Finance Corporation.
«Doing Business 2013»
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Table 2: The effect of market power on the Nonperforming Loans (NPL)
Dependent Variable: Nonperforming
































































R-squared 0.839630 0.883122 0.803588
Adjusted  R-squared 0.833461 0.878627 0.796034
F-Statistic 136.1246 196.4538 106.3747
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
*, ** and *** indicate statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 3: The effect of market power on the Z-index






























































R-squared 0.910460 0.705104 0.739764
Adjusted  R-squared 0.907016 0.693762 0.729755
F-Statistic 264.3729 62.16676 73.90919
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
*, ** and *** indicate statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
19Market Structure and Bank Fragility: Application to the Tunisian Banking System
Table 4: The effect of market power on bank capitalization






























































R-squared 0.997815 0.982037 0.970879
Adjusted  R-squared 0.997731 0.981346 0.969759
F-Statistic 11872.91 1421.410 866.8185
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
*, ** and *** indicate statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
NOTES
1 APTBEF: Tunisian Professional Association of Banks and Financial Institutions 
2 An index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending. The index 
ranges from 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better de-
signed to expand access to credit.
3 All these variables are presented in Table 1 of Appendix. 
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